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Abstract
This paper empirically tests the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis with a
narrative measure of tax shocks. The present value, at the time of legislation,
of tax increases motivated solely by concerns for improving the ﬁscal health of
the government is used for the tests. These tax news represent a switch from
debt to tax ﬁnancing that should have no eﬀects on the economy if Ricardian
equivalence holds as a good approximation. For the post-1980:IV period, I ﬁnd
evidence for ﬁscal anticipation as many of the tax increases are implemented
with substantial delays and distortionary taxes increase economic activity before
taxes go up, which is caused by intertemporal substitution. Therefore, Ricardian
equivalence is rejected.
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11. Introduction
The recent global ﬁnancial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crises in Eu-
rope have put ﬁscal policy center stage. An important benchmark for ﬁscal policy
is the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. It states that it does not matter for the
economy whether government expenditures are ﬁnanced by current taxation or in-
stead by issuing government bonds (Barro, 1974). Ricardian households are only
concerned about the present value of their intertemporal tax liabilities, which are
in turn determined by the present value of the stream of government expenditures
and currently outstanding government debt. The timing of taxes does not matter.
Government bonds are simply seen as postponed taxes that will have to be paid at
some future date. Hence, a switch from tax to bond ﬁnancing, or vice vera, has no
eﬀect on macroeconomic variables. Barro (1974) argued that Ricardian consumers
react, as long as the stream of government spending is kept ﬁxed, to an increase in the
government deﬁcit by increasing savings by an equal amount. The tax cut leads to
a dollar-for-dollar increase in bond holdings. Therefore, neither output nor interest
rates change. The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is based on several restrictive
assumptions, such as lump-sum taxes, perfect capital markets where forward-looking
households do not face liquidity constraints and can borrow at the same interest
rate as the government, altruistic operative bequests that link generations, and no
uncertainty about the future tax incidence.
A large number of theoretical and empirical papers have studied Ricardian
equivalence. This literature has been surveyed by Seater (1993) and more recently by
Ricciuti (2003). On a theoretical level, relaxing the very strict assumptions necessary
for Ricardian equivalence can lead to government bonds having either positive or
negative net wealth eﬀects for households, as argued by Barro (1974, 1989), instead
of government bonds not being considered net wealth under Ricardian equivalence.
For example, Judd (1987) demonstrated this in a theoretical model with distortionary
taxes, ﬁnite lives, and adjustment costs. Wealth eﬀects can cancel each other or be
altogether negligible. Therefore, the fact that tax systems are generally not based
on lump-sum taxation does not invalidate Ricardian equivalence, as, for example,
2transportation costs do not invalidate the assumption of perfect competition in many
applications. The issue cannot be settled on theoretical grounds. An answer to
whether Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation to reality has to come from
empirical studies.1 This means that the issue of how good of an approximation
Ricardian equivalence is cannot be determine based on theory and empirical tests
are called for. However, the two surveys show that the empirical evidence is not
conclusive.
The ﬁrst goal of this paper is to shed new light on the controversial issue of
whether the economy displays Ricardian equivalence features, which is of great rele-
vance in particular to orienting theoretical models and for understanding some of the
eﬀects (associated with tax increases) of ﬁscal consolidation, a timely topic. I suggest
a new test of Ricardian equivalence that relies on a narrative measure for a surprise
switch from bond ﬁnancing to taxation. Such a switch should have no eﬀects on real
GDP and interest rates if Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation. A current
increase in taxes that reduces outstanding bonds implies an oﬀsetting reduction in
future taxes. I use for this purpose the present value of discretionary changes in
tax revenue that were motivate by concerns about the inherited government budget
deﬁcit and were introduced for reasons unrelated to current macroeconomic ﬂuctua-
tions or government spending. Various narrative tax measures have been constructed
for U.S. ﬁscal policy by Romer and Romer (2010).2 They used historical documents
to carefully identify types of legislated tax changes from the motivations provided by
lawmakers at the time of passage, such as the U.S. Congress, Economic Report of the
President, Budget, Senate, Social Security, and Treasury Secretary reports, records,
and bulletins. They call the ﬁscal surprise shock (news), that I use, an exogenous (as
opposed to endogenous) "deﬁcit-driven" tax revenue increase motivated by concerns
about inherited budget deﬁcits and not caused by current spending.3
1See also Evans (1991). Furthermore, Evans et al. (2012) recently showed that rational expecta-
tions are not necessary for Ricardian equivalence to hold and a certain adaptive learning rule instead
can produce equivalence.
2They have been used by several others, such as Favero and Giavazzi (2012), and references that
they provided. Furthermore, the narrative approach was also used by, among others, Ramey (2011)
to study instead the eﬀects of large U.S. military build-ups.
3A closely related study, using Romer and Romer's methodology, was presented by Cloyne (2013)
for the United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom has no precedents of "ﬁscal consolidations,"
3The second goal of the paper is to check whether the results of Romer and
Romer (2010) are robust to using a subcategory of their data set that they did not
consider in separation: the present value of deﬁcit-driven legislated tax changes. A
subcategory of their aggregated exogenous tax shocks may or may not behave dif-
ferently from the aggregated. Romer and Romer (2010) calculated a cumulative tax
multiplier of close to -3, so that a tax revenue decreases of 1% of GDP leads to an
increase in GDP of close to 3%.
Section 2 describes aspects of the data relevant for my study and Section 3
presents results for the full post-WWII sample and for two sub-samples, one prior to
and the other post 1980:IV. Once I account for a structural break in 1980:IV, the prior
sample has too few observations to allow reliable inference. But the post-1980:IV sam-
ple delivers empirical results that show that deﬁcit-driven tax increases have statically
signiﬁcant and positive eﬀects on economic growth during the implementation-lag pe-
riod, before the announced tax increases take eﬀect. Ricardian equivalence is therefore
not supported by the data. Moreover, I ﬁnd support for ﬁscal anticipation, contrary
to Romer and Romer (2010). The subcategory that I consider therefore behave very
diﬀerently. The conclusion discusses further implication of my ﬁndings.
2. Exogenous Tax News Motivated by Deﬁcit Reduc-
tion: The Data
Romer and Romer (2010) constructed in their seminal paper two "news" series
for discretionary tax changes that are unrelated to the business cycle. One is for tax
changes motivated by concerns about long-run economic growth. The other is for
tax changes motivated by concerns about the government budget deﬁcit that are also
unrelated to the current business cycle. For each of the two series they construct two
measures: one recording the amount of the tax change relative to GDP when it takes
eﬀect; the other recording the present value of the tax change when it is legislated,
again as a ratio to GDP. The three-year Treasury bond rate is used for discounting
dealing with inherited budget deﬁcits that are unrelated to the business cycle, as would be necessary
for testing Ricardian equivalence.
4future tax revenue changes to the time when a measure was passed into law.4
Romer and Romer (2010) used in their empirical analysis several measures of
exogenous tax news. One is the sum of the deﬁcit driven tax changes and the tax
changes motivated by long-run economic growth, at the time of their implementation.
A second and third measure are the two news components in separation: deﬁcit-driven
tax changes and long-run tax changes, both at the time of their implementation. A
fourth measure is the present value of the stream of both exogenous tax changes
at the time when they were legislated, instead of actual values at the time of their
implementation as in the ﬁrst measure. Romer and Romer did not consider separately
the present values of the deﬁcit-driven tax changes.5 As explained earlier, I use in
this paper the present values of the nominal deﬁcit-driven tax changes at the time
when they are legislated, as percent of nominal GDP.
Most of the exogenous deﬁcit-driven tax changes were motivated by concerns
over the long-run solvency of the Social Security system. For example, the Social
Security Amendments of 1977 and 1983 were major tax increases that did not si-
multaneously increase beneﬁts. The largest deﬁcit-driven tax increases not related
to Social Security were those in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of
1982 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993. There are ten
(nine) quarters with deﬁcit-driven exogenous tax changes in the sample period from
1945:I to 2007:IV (1950:I to 2007:IV). This is a considerably larger number than the
four quarterly non-zero observations for the war dummy variable in Ramey (2011).
Figure 1 depicts the present values of deﬁcit-driven tax changes as percent of GDP.
The values range from 0.023% in 1997:III to 1.153% in 1977:IV. In comparison, the
non-zero defense build-up dates in Ramey (2011, Table II, pp. 26-27) represent the
following shares of GDP: 63.06% in 1950:III, 0.33% in 1965:I, 6.36% in 1980:I, and
0.94% in 2001:III. Two of these events show much larger portions of GDP than values
in my sample, though not the remaining ones. In addition, none of the deﬁcit-driven
dates overlap with the dates for the present values of long-run exogenous tax changes
4Footnote 25 in Romer and Romer (2010, p. 793) provides more details.
5Romer and Romer (2009a) on the other hand studied tax cuts driven by long-run economic
considerations in order to test the hypothesis that such tax reductions lead to decreases in future
government spending.
5of Romer and Romer (2010).
When Ricardian equivalence does not hold, the permanent income hypothesis
predicts that consumers react to news about current or future tax increases (decreases)
by immediately reducing (increasing) consumption. This initial reaction could then
possibly lead to additional dynamics. However, there should be no additional reaction
associated with the time when tax changes actually take eﬀect if they are not imple-
mented at the time of being passed into law. The correct approach under the perma-
nent income hypothesis for dealing with tax news is therefore to use the present value
of tax news at the time when they are announced and to relate output movements
to current and lagged values of a measure of news about tax changes. This scenario
holds with lump-sum taxes. On the other hand, in the presence of distortionary taxes
and when Ricardian equivalence does not hold, intertemporal substitution predicts
an increase in consumption (or investment, depending on the type of tax used) when
the implementation of a tax increase is delayed. In other words, spending is moved
forward in time to take advantage of lower taxes before the tax increase takes eﬀect.
Leeper et al. (2008) referred to this as ﬁscal foresight or anticipation. In this case,
the model needs to account for both the date when the tax change is announced
(legislated) and the dates when it is implemented.
When Ricardian equivalence holds, households incorporate the intertemporal
government budget constraint into their permanent income. The tax news measure
relevant to them is the present value of Romer and Romer's (2010) deﬁcit-driven
tax changes. This measure is constructed is such a way that it is orthogonal to all
other information available in a given period.6 It is therefore ideally suited for testing
Ricardian equivalence. At the time when the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shocks
are announced (not when they are implemented), there are no associated changes to
government spending announced, so that there are no government spending shocks at
that time that are associated with the speciﬁc tax news.7 This is exactly the scenario
6See Romer and Romer (2010)and Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
7In a regression context this means that such narrative variables are, as long as orthogonality
holds, uncorrelated with other included and other omitted regression variables and their regression
coeﬃcient estimates are unbiased. The only eﬀect of omitted variables is to increase the residual
variance. It is therefore possible to analyze the eﬀects of exogenous tax changes on economic activity,
such as real GDP growth, without specifying an economic model that includes other ﬁscal and
6needed for testing the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, i.e., keeping the expected
stream of government spending ﬁxed when a tax news shock hits.
Would Romer and Romer's (2010) tax cuts motivated by concerns about long-
run growth be suitable for testing Ricardian equivalence? The long-run tax-change
variables were constructed so that they are orthogonal to the current business cycle
and current government spending. However, the stated intention of these tax shocks
was explicitly to either decrease the size of the government (e.g., the 1981 Reagan tax
cuts) or to spur productivity growth and increase eﬃciency. This subcomponent of tax
changes, which stimulates long-run growth, is therefore not valid for testing Ricardian
equivalence because there are associated changes in future government spending or in
future income that both aﬀect permanent income. In order to illustrate the Ricardian
case, it is useful to look at a simpliﬁed version of the intertemporal government budget
constraint (see, e.g., Hakkio and Rush, 1991, and Haug, 1996):8
∞∑
s=1
(1 + r)−sREt+s = Bt +
∞∑
s=1
(1 + r)−sGEt+s)− lim
s→∞
(1 + r)−sBt+s,
where REt is real tax revenue in period t, including revenue from monetizing deﬁcits
by printing money (which is treated as an inﬂation tax). Bt denotes real government
debt, r is the real interest rate, and GEt stands for real government expenditures
on purchases of goods and services plus transfer payments. It is assumed that the
government does not follow a Ponzi scheme so that intertemporal government budget
balance holds and the limit term in the above equation goes to zero.
Ricardian households do not change their consumption and savings plans as
long as the present discounted value of expected future tax revenues, which is equal
to current bonds and expected future government spending, does not change. The
future path of government debt is irrelevant because all debt has to be ultimately
ﬁnanced by taxes. The above deﬁcit-driven tax news ﬁt this scenario under our null
hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence, because the tax increases are explicitly targeting
a reduction in inherited deﬁcits and therefore lead to less national debt. Less national
monetary policy variables.
8It is straightforward to deﬁne this intertemporal government budget constraint instead in terms
of ratios to GDP to illustrate the eﬀects (see, e.g., Hakkio and Rush, 1991).
7debt means an oﬀsetting reduction (in present value terms) in implied future taxes.
Hence, a deﬁcit reduction now is a switch from future to current taxation, while
the stream of government spending is expressly kept ﬁxed. In other words, the two
diﬀerent time paths of taxes (before and after the deﬁcit-driven tax news) have the
same present discounted values under the null hypothesis.
The data cover the period from the ﬁrst quarter in 1945 to the fourth quarter
in 2007. Following Romer and Romer (2010), I start regressions in 1950:I in order to
allow for suﬃcient lags drawing on observations from earlier quarters. The data for
the narrative measure of exogenous deﬁcit-driven tax changes (as percent of GDP),
the real GDP growth rate, the natural logarithm of real GDP, and the three-month
Treasury bill rate are all from Romer and Romer's (2010) data ﬁle. The data are
available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.3, along with
RATS software code and a detailed description of the construction of narrative vari-
ables (Romer and Romer, 2009b).
Regressions were carried out with the software WinRATS, version 6.35, based
on the original code of Romer and Romer (2010), except for the CUSUM of squares
tests that were done in EViews, version 8.1. In order to check the accuracy of the code,
regressions were repeated with EViews. Further, I replicated the main regressions in
Romer and Romer (2010) with EViews and got the same results.
3. Ricardian Equivalence Test Results: OLS and VAR
3.1 Full Sample Period: OLS Without and With Controls for Output
Growth
The ﬁrst step in the analysis of Romer and Romer (2010, equation (6), p.
780) is to study the eﬀect of an exogenous tax change on real output growth. Instead
of using total exogenous tax changes, I select the present value of deﬁcit-driven tax
changes only:
∆Yt = α+
12∑
i=0
βi∆Tt−i + εt, (1)
8where ∆Yt is the log change (growth rate) of real GDP, ∆Tt is the present value of
the stream of tax changes legislated at time t, and εt is a mean-zero Gaussian error
that is orthogonal to all ∆Tt−i by construction of the narrative tax changes. The sum∑j
i=0 βi measures the cumulative ﬁscal multiplier from period 0 to period j.
The permanent income hypothesis predicts for tax increases a negative ef-
fect on consumption as expected after-tax real income falls and government bonds
are treated as net wealth under Ricardian non-equivalence so that overall household
wealth falls. This causes additional dynamics that lower real GDP so that βi < 0 for
some or all i. On the other hand, intertemporal substitution predicts, in the presence
of distortionary taxes and Ricardian non-equivalence, an increase in consumption (or
investment, depending on the type of tax used) before the implementation of a tax
increase (assuming there is a delay; hence βi > 0 for periods i till the implementa-
tion date) and a decrease after the tax takes eﬀect (with βi < 0 for periods i after
the implementation date). In contrast, Ricardian equivalence predicts that the ef-
fects on real GDP from such a deﬁcit-driven tax increase should not be statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (all βi = 0).
Figure 2 presents the cumulative eﬀect of a 1% of GDP increase in deﬁcit-
driven tax revenue (solid line) on real GDP, estimated with ordinary least squares
(OLS). The eﬀect on real GDP is negative in the ﬁrst period and positive thereafter,
reaching a peak of 1.98% ﬁve periods after the tax shock and then declining. Are
the eﬀects of deﬁcit driven tax increases statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero?
The answer depends on the width of the conﬁdence bands used in Figure 2. The
usual two standard-error conﬁdence band, which is for normally distributed coeﬃcient
estimates approximately a 95% conﬁdence band, indicates no statistical signiﬁcance
at any horizon in Figure 2. Using instead the one standard-error conﬁdence band,
which is equivalent to an approximate 68% conﬁdence band, gives a diﬀerent picture.
Now, the responses of real GDP are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
horizons three to eight after the tax shock. However, in contrast to Romer and
Romer's results with all exogenous tax shocks, the responses are positive so that the
tax increase causes an increase in real GDP at these horizons.
The next step in Romer and Romer (2010) is to include in equation (1) the
9lags of GDP growth:
∆Yt = α+
12∑
i=0
βi∆Tt−i ++
11∑
i=1
γj∆Yt−j + εt. (2)
The lags of output growth control for the dynamics of GDP and a "multitude of other
inﬂuences" (Romer and Romer, 2010, p. 781). Figure 3 reports the eﬀects of a 1%
of GDP increase in deﬁcit-driven taxes on real GDP when lagged output growth is
controlled for in the regression. Overall the eﬀects are similar in magnitude to those
without controls, though the peak eﬀect is lower. The two and one standard-error
conﬁdence bands are calculated from bootstraps with 10,000 replications. The eﬀect
in the ﬁrst period is again negative but remains statistically insigniﬁcant for the 95%
conﬁdence band. The 68% conﬁdence band indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the
ﬁrst horizon, although just barely so. The only other horizon where there is possibly
statistical signiﬁcance is the fourth one, but again it is very much a borderline case.
Romer and Romer (2010) report 68% conﬁdence bands. However, Ramey
(2011, footnote 11, p. 11) pointed out that there is "no formal justiﬁcation" provided
in the literature for using 68% conﬁdence bands instead of the usual 95% bands.
Furthermore, it is neither justiﬁed on theoretical grounds to use 68% bands.
The empirical evidence over the full sample period would seem to favor the
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. This is because tax increases, intended to reduce
inherited budget deﬁcits, have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on real output at
usual conﬁdence levels, unlike Romer and Romer's results for using all exogenous tax
shocks. But, the crucial question is whether the regressions in equations (1) and (2)
are structurally stable over the sample period.
The cumulative sum (CUSUM) of squares test is based on squared recursive
residuals that are calculated from sequentially increasing samples, starting with the
ﬁrst thirteen observations in our case up to the full sample size. This test was proposed
by Brown et al. (1975). The test provides an indication of parameter or variance
instability in the case of unknown break dates. Figures 4a and 4b depict the values
of the CUSUM of squares statistic along with the upper and lower 5% signiﬁcance
lines. Test statistic values outside the area between the two signiﬁcance lines mark
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the time periods when structural change likely occurred. For both Figures 4a and 4b,
calculated from equations (1) and (2), the time interval of structural change includes
the year 1980. I therefore follow Romer and Romer (2010), among many others, and
split the sample into a period prior to 1980:IV and post-1980:IV.
3.2 The Prior- and Post-1980:IV Periods: OLSWithout and With Controls
for Output Growth
Figure 5a shows for equation (2) the cumulative eﬀect of a 1% of GDP increase
in deﬁcit-driven tax revenue on GDP, in the sub-sample period 1950:I to 1980:IV. The
eﬀect on real GDP is not statistically signiﬁcant whether the bootstrapped 95% or
68% conﬁdence bands are used, except for the ﬁrst period. The conﬁdence bands are
quite wide indicating that the coeﬃcients are not estimated very precisely. This is
not surprising because there are only three news shocks (tax changes) in this sample
period.
Figure 5b presents for equation (2) cumulative eﬀects of a 1% of GDP in-
crease in deﬁcit-driven tax revenue on GDP in the post-1980:IV period from 1981:I
to 2007:IV. The response to a tax increase is positive and statistically signiﬁcant from
period four to nine after the impact for the bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence band. The
impact reaches a peak of 4.72%, i.e., the cumulative multiplier peaks at a positive
value of 4.72. However, I have not yet considered a VAR speciﬁcation and ﬁscal
foresight in deriving this result.
3.3 The Prior- and Post-1980:IV Period: A VAR With Tax Shocks, Real
GDP and an Interest Rate
An alternative model speciﬁcation to single equations is a VAR. The three-
variable VAR consists of the narrative deﬁcit-driven present value of the tax shock
as a percent of GDP, the log of real GDP and the three-month Treasury bill rate
in percent. Following Romer and Romer (2010), I use 12 lags on each variable and
order them for a Cholesky decomposition with the tax shock ﬁrst, followed by real
GDP and then the Treasury bill rate last. This ordering allows for tax changes to
aﬀect output contemporaneously but output shocks and interest rate shocks have no
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contemporaneous, i.e., within the same quarter, eﬀects on tax changes. The interest
rate responds contemporaneously to all shocks. There are no restrictions on lagged
responses of variables to shocks. The appeal of the VAR approach is that it allows
for rich endogenous dynamics that follow unexpected ﬁscal policy changes.
Figure 6a shows the cumulative impulse response of real GDP to a deﬁcit-
driven tax shock in the sample prior to 1980:IV. It is negative and statistically signif-
icant initially, in the ﬁrst period, then becomes positive afterwards but is no longer
statistically signiﬁcant at 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals. The bootstrapped
68% conﬁdence band paints a similar picture with somewhat borderline signiﬁcance
in periods seven and eight. The band is quite wide and, consistent with the single
equation regression results, reveals imprecise estimation.
Figure 6b is for the post-1980:IV period and the cumulative eﬀect of a 1% of
GDP deﬁcit-driven tax increase. The eﬀects on real GDP are positive throughout
the impulse horizon considered. At the 95% bootstrapped conﬁdence band, the tax
increase leads to an increase in real GDP that is statically signiﬁcant from period
three to eight and peaks at a value of 3.11 in period six after the tax shock. Again,
the results are similar to those with the single equation regressions from before.
3.4 The Role of Fiscal Anticipation in the Post-1980:IV Period
One possible explanation of the apparent positive ﬁscal multipliers for the
post-1980:IV period in response to a tax increase is the intertemporal substitution
eﬀect due to lags in implementing tax increases. The eﬀect of the announcement of
a tax increase in future quarters (instead of an immediate increase at the time of the
announcement) will lead to increases in spending before the tax increase takes eﬀect,
whether through direct eﬀects or through increased work hours when payroll taxes
are involved. For this argument to hold, taxes are not assumed to be lump-sum but
distortionary. In order to explore this possibility, I separate out deﬁcit-driven tax
changes that are implemented with a delay of one or more quarters and therefore
become anticipated in quarters after the announcement. The remainder of deﬁcit-
driven tax change announcements are news and are unanticipated shocks. Following
Favero and Giavazzi (2012), I construct a new variable for the anticipated tax changes
12
by, in my case, measuring all deﬁcit driven tax changes (again as a fraction of GDP)
that are known in period t to be implemented in a future period t+i. I run separate
regressions for unanticipated and anticipated deﬁcit-driven tax changes.
Figure 7a reports the cumulative multipliers for an unanticipated deﬁcit-driven
tax shock in the post 1980:IV period. As one would expect based on standard theory,
the eﬀects on real GDP are negative at all horizons. The largest negative eﬀect
occurs in the third quarter after the impact and the multiplier reaches a value of
-1.67, however, all multiplier estimates are insigniﬁcant at the usual 5% level. This
value is about half the size of the value calculated by Romer and Romer (2010).
However, estimates are too imprecise to draw further conclusions on the size of the
tax multiplier when tax shocks are unanticipated. This is due to having only ﬁve
observations on these types of tax shocks.
Figure 7b graphs the responses of real GDP to an anticipated change in taxes
in the post-1980:IV period. If intertemporal substitution was happening, one would
expect positive eﬀects of announced tax increases on real GDP. Indeed, Figure 7b
shows positive cumulative multipliers from three quarter onwards and the multipliers
are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in quarters ﬁve to twelve after the
impact.9 The cumulative multiplier reaches a maximum value of 2.53 in quarter ten.
The estimates are relatively precise, given that I have a sample with 12 observations
on anticipated tax shocks in the post-1980:IV period. These results are consistent
with intertemporal substitution due to ﬁscal anticipation or foresight as argued by
Leeper et al. (2008). Furthermore, Ricardian equivalence is hence not supported by
data using the narrative record on tax changes.
4. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on ﬁscal policy by using a
part of a narrative measures developed by Romer and Romer (2010) not used previ-
ously. I provide new empirical evidence on the validity of the Ricardian equivalence
hypothesis and analyze the robustness of their ﬁndings for a subcategory of their own
9Using instead a VAR as in Section 3.3 leads to similar results.
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data set. Ricardian equivalence may be a good approximation to reality and the fact
that taxes are generally not lump-sum does not necessarily invalidate it (Judd, 1987).
I use the present-values of the deﬁcit-driven sub-category of Romer and Romer's
(2010) data to shed new light on an unresolved empirical question.
The empirical results do not support the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis
because the eﬀects of a tax increase, keeping government spending ﬁxed, have a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on real GDP. The results are robust to the speciﬁcation
of the model either as a single equation or as a vector-autoregressive system. While
Ricardian equivalence seemed to be supported at ﬁrst sight over the full post-WWII
sample period, I ﬁnd that this result does not hold up when I split the sample in
1980:IV. The post-1980:IV sample allows for precise inference that shows that in-
creasing taxes solely motivated by concerns over the health of the ﬁscal position of
the government has a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on real GDP for antic-
ipated tax increases. This positive eﬀect on GDP during the implementation-lag
period is predicted by the theory of ﬁscal anticipation of Leeper et al. (2008). In-
tertemporal substitution leads to a ﬁscal stimulus ahead of the implementation date
for a tax increase but it comes at the expense of lower economic activity afterwards.
In other words, there is no free lunch, as the ﬁscal stimulus ahead of the imple-
mentation is followed by lower economic activity after the tax increases take hold.
These results are diﬀerent from those of Romer and Romer (2010), who added in tax
changes motivated by concerns over long-run economic growth. Also, these results
are relevant for some aspects of ﬁscal consolidation policies, and for tax cuts but with
opposite eﬀects. Assessing the negative quantitative eﬀects after the implementation
of anticipated taxes is not a trivial task that I leave for future research.
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FIGURE 1. Present values at time of passage for deficit-driven tax increases
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FIGURE 2. Estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1%
                  of GDP on GDP, as in equation (1) with no controls for lagged GDP
                  growth and one and two standard-error confidence bands
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FIGURE 3. Estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax increase of 1%
                  of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) with controls for lagged GDP growth
                  and one and two standard-error confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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FIGURE 4a. Structural change test of the GDP growth regression with no controls
                    as in equation (1)
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FIGURE 4b. Structural change test of the GDP growth regression with controls
                     as in equation (2)
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FIGURE 5a. Prior-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) with controls
                    for lagged GDP growth and one and two standard-error
                    confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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FIGURE 5b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, as in equation (2) with controls
                    for lagged GDP growth and one and two standard-error
                    confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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FIGURE 6a. Prior-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, in a VAR with 3 variables
                    and one and two standard-error confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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FIGURE 6b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an exogenous deficit-driven tax
                    increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, in a VAR with 3 variables
                    and one and two standard-error confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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FIGURE 7a. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an unanticipated exogenous deficit-driven
                    tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, with one and two standard-error
                    confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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FIGURE 7b. Post-1980:IV estimated impact of an anticipated exogenous deficit-driven
                    tax increase of 1 % of GDP on GDP, with one and two standard-error
                    confidence bands (bootstrapped)
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